Similar Search Results

The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts

Bourjade, Sylvain; Jullien, Bruno - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status …We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the …, revealing the intensity of the expert's bias doesn't always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009368142

Financial Experts, Asset Prices and Reputation

Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

We analyze how financial experts influence asset prices in a sequential trading model. In the model, an expert of … information about the expert's ability is private to traders and only revealed through trades. When the expert's reputation is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110283

Lobbying, Information Transmission and Unequal Representation

Frisell, Lars; Lagerlöf, Johan N. M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

his reputation for truth telling, we show that the larger the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792547

The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs

Miyagawa, Eiichi; Miyahara, Yasuyuki; Sekiguchi, Tadashi - Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University - 2004

This paper studies repeated games with private monitoring where players make optimal decisions with respect to costly monitoring activities, just as they do with respect to stage-game actions. We consider the case where each player can observe other players' current-period actions accurately...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385284

Distortion in Screening and Spatial Preferences

Kokovin, Sergey; Nahata, Babu; Zhelobodko, Evgeny - National Research University Higher School of Economics - 2014

We study a multidimensional screening problem with minimal restrictions on valuations. Our ?-relaxation of the constraints excludes bunching and cycles in the graph of active incentive-compatibility constraints. Therefore, the Lagrange multipliers do exist and enable us in characterizing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011098912

Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring

Chan, Jimmy; Zhang, Wenzhang - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 188-211

This paper shows that a cartel that observes neither costs, prices, nor sales may still enforce a collusive agreement by tying each firm's continuation profit to the truncated current profits of the other firms. The mechanism applies to both price and quantity competition, and the main features...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263582

Diagnosing Efficiency of Distortion in Discrete Screening

Sergey, Kokovin; Evgeniy, Zhelobodko - EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS - 2008

We study the screening or nonlinear pricing for discrete consumer types when the single-crossing condition need not hold. A method is developed to reveal social eff±ciency or distortion of equilibria from market observations. The two known indicators of effciency, namely absence of almost-envy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094960

Overall Inefficiency and Cycles in Non-ordered Screening under Capacity Constraints and Standardization

Sergey, Kokovin; Evgeniy, Zhelobodko - EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS - 2008

We study discrete-type screening without Spence-Mirrlees condition. Under non-separable and non-concave cost, all packages can be distorted in equilibrium, even when only the participation constraints are active. This and other paradoxical effects, shown by examples, are caused by some kind of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094970

Profitable Flat-fee Pricing for Information and other Goods

Sergey, Kokovin; Evgeniy, Zhelobodko - EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS - 2008

It is shown that supplementing any usage-based pricing with a flatt-fee scheme is profit improving when the savings from transactions costs and from deadweight loss by using flat fee exceed the additional production costs. We use a most general model, without many traditionally used assumptions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011094998

Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements

Vasconcelos, Luís - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 19-33

I analyze a model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage. The asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties. I show that contractual signaling and efficiency of investment can conflict if only quantity is contractible. This conflict generates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049874