In this paper we analyze the welfare properties of the set of Drèze equilibria for economies with incomplete markets and firms. The well known fact that a Drèze equilibrium need not be constrained Pareto optimal is often attributed to a lack of coordination between firms. We show that there...

We consider economies with incomplete markets, one good per state, two periods, t=0,1, private ownership of initial endowments, a single firm, and no assets other than shares in this firm. In Dierker, Dierker, Grodal (2002), we give an example of such an economy in which all market equilibria...

We consider an economy with incomplete markets and a single firm and assume that utility can be freely transferred in the form of the initially available good 0 (quasilinearity). In this particularly simple and transparent framework, the objective of a firm can be defined as the maximization of...

The objective of a firm is not well-defined if firms have market power. We present an example of Cournot-Walras competition in order to shed light on this problem and to motivate the concept of real wealth maximization that B. Grodal and E. Dierker have proposed asthe firm's objective. (JEL:...

We consider economies with incomplete markets, production, an a given distribution of initial endowments. The main purpose of the paper is to present a robust example of an economy with only one firm and one good per state in which no production decision entails a constrained efficient outcome....