We analyze the evolution of behavioral rules for learning how to play a two-armed bandit. Individuals have no information about the underlying pay-off distributions and have limited memory about their own past experience. Instead they must rely on information obtained through observing the...

We consider the situation in which individuals in a finite population must repeatedly choose an action yielding an uncertain payoff. Between choices, each individual may observe the performance of one other individual. We search for rules of behavior with limited memory that increase expected...

We analyze the evolution of behavioral rules for learning how to play a two-armed bandit. Individuals have no information about the underlying pay-off distributions and have limited memory about their own past experience. Instead they must rely on information obtained trough observing the...

The evolutionary selection of outcomes (modelled using the replicator dynamics) in games with costless communication depends crucially on the structural assumptions made on the underlying population. (1) In conflicts between two interacting populations, common interest implies that the set of...

We extend the notions of evolutionary stability and, for the first time, that of neutral stability to asymmetric games played between two populations. Stability with respect to simultaneous entry of a small proportion of mutants into both populations is considered. Allocations where neither...

Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We present a simple model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before play captures talk about intentions, after play...

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...

The introduction of sanctions provides incentives for more pro-social behavior, but may also be a signal that non-cooperation is prevalent. In an experimental minimum-effort coordination game we investigate the effects of the information contained in the choice to sanction. We compare the effect...

This paper introduces the concept of ordient for binary relations (preferences), a relative of the concept of gradient for functions (utilities). Ordients have a natural economic interpretation as marginal rates of substitution. Some examples of ordientable binary relations include the...