Gneezy (2005) reports evidence indicating that in some settings people do not like to lie. In many other situations people do not suffer when they lie. We argue that the theory of simple guilt can accommodate these observations.

Is truth-value of a statement what lying aversion is all about? We propose an experimental test and find only limited support. In this context with 'bare promises', we also test for guilt aversion and again find only limited support.

We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game...

We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and patterns of lies and truth quite systematic)...

Evidence suggests that whether or not people dislike lying is situation-dependent. We argue that the theory of simple guilt can accommodate this well.

A fair price model in which firms are hesitant to raise their prices due to concerns about adverse consumer reactions is developed and integrated into the standard New Keynesian framework. In the model, monetary neutrality arise as a combination of a fairness constraint putting a limit on how...