This paper considers a two-period optimal contracting model in which firms make new hires in the second period subject to the constraint that they cannot pay discriminate either against or in favour of the new hires. Under an assumption on the information available to workers, it is shown that...

This paper considers a class of two-player dynamic games in which each player controls a one-dimensional variable which we interpret as a level of cooperation. In the base model, there is an irreversibility constraint stating that this variable can never be reduced, only increased. It otherwise...

This paper considers a class of two-player dynamic games in which each player controls a one-dimensional action variable, interpreted as a level of cooperation. The dynamics are due to an irreversibility constraint: neither player can ever reduce his cooperation level. Payoffs are decreasing in...

This paper provides a simple theoretical framework to discuss the relationship between assisted reproductive technologies and the microeconomics of fertility choice. Individuals make choices of education and work along with decisions about whether and when to have children. Decisions regarding...

In his wide ranging attempt to review the literature on economic development and welfare in relation to the environment, Lomborg claims balance and objectivity, but actually presents a thoroughly misleading picture of environmental prospects and research, global economic development, and the...