Admati and Perry (1987) derive the equilibrium in a bargaining game between a seller and buyer when the buyer's valuation is private information. They show that, for some parameter values, trade occurs at the Rubinstein (1982) prices given the buyer's true valuation (pl if the buyer has a low...

We develop a parametric model in which a high-quality dominant firm faces a low-quality competitive fringe. We show that in this model, an increase in the dominant firm's product quality increases total welfare and consumer surplus. An increase in fringe firm quality has an ambiguous effect on...

In this paper we analyze the relationship between the correlation between morality and human capital (“ability”) on the one hand and aggregate economic performance on the other. Morality is defined as an aversion to consuming goods obtained through appropriative rather than productive...

This paper incorporates morality -- defined as lower utility from consuming goods obtained through appropriative rather than productive activities -- into a simple static general equilibrium model in which agents choose whether to be producers or appropriators. The authors analyze the...

We consider a high-quality dominant firm facing a low-quality competitive fringe. We show that the dominant firm's quantity is (weakly) increasing in its quality if and only if its marginal cost (weakly) exceeds that of the fringe; otherwise it is strictly decreasing in quality. This result is...