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Incentives to Corporate Governance Activism

Leech, Dennis - Royal Economic Society - RES - 2003

This paper considers incentives faced by investors (financial institutions) to become actively involved in the … costs of investor activism separately, it questions the conventional wisdom -based on simplistic agency theory - that share … ownership is so widely held in the UK that such incentives are too weak for shareholder activism to be a rational basis of a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005398515

Institutional investors and ownership engagement

Çelik, Serdar; Isaksson, Mats - In: OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 2013 (2013) 2, pp. 93-114

This article provides a framework for analysing the character and degree of ownership engagement by institutional investors.It argues that the general term “institutional investor” in itself doesn’t say very much about the quality or degree of ownership engagement. It is therefore an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011007280

Institutional Investors as Owners: Who Are They and What Do They Do?

Çelik, Serdar; Isaksson, Mats - Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprises … - 2013

This paper provides a framework for analysing the character and degree of ownership engagement by institutional investors. It argues that the general term “institutional investor” in itself doesn’t say very much about the quality or degree of ownership engagement. It is therefore an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276718

Why is hedge fund activism procyclical?

Burkart, Mike; Dasgupta, Amil - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

incentives for activism and engendering procyclicality. Our model thus provides a theoretical explanation that links the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084491

Liquidity and Governance

Back, Kerry E.; Li, Tao; Ljungqvist, Alexander P. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Is greater trading liquidity good or bad for corporate governance? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. We solve a model consisting of an optimal IPO followed by a dynamic Kyle market in which the large investor's private information concerns her own plans for taking an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084717

Do UK Institutional Shareholders Monitor their Investee Firms?

Renneboog, Luc; Goergen, M.; Zhang, C. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008

As institutional investors are the largest shareholders in most listed UK firms, one expects them to monitor the firms they invest in. However, there is mounting empirical evidence which suggests that they do not perform any monitoring. This paper provides a new test on whether UK institutional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090281

Shareholder Activism through the Proxy Process

Renneboog, Luc; Szilagyi, P.G. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2009

This paper provides evidence on the corporate governance role of shareholderinitiated proxy proposals. Previous studies debate over whether activists use proxy proposals to discipline firms or to simply advance their self-serving agendas, and whether proxy proposals are effective at all in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090883

Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals : The European Perspective

Renneboog, Luc; Cziraki, P.; Szilagyi, P.G. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2009

particular, with major variations across countries in ownership structures, monitoring incentives, and the laws and regulations … leverage, which is consistent with agency considerations. However, the stock price effects are most negative for poorly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091079

Shareholder activism by hedge funds in a concentrated ownership environment: an empirical study for Germany

Stadler, Maximilian; Knyhausen-Aufseß, Dodo zu; … - In: International Journal of Financial Services Management 8 (2015) 1, pp. 58-82

This study seeks to extend hedge fund activism research to a country where the ownership structure is dominated by large major shareholders. Until now, studies about hedge fund activism mainly treated countries with dispersed ownership structures. Using an event study with 133 German hedge fund...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011207724

Evidence on the outcome of Say-On-Pay votes: How managers, directors, and shareholders respond

Brunarski, Kelly R.; Campbell, T. Colin; Harman, Yvette S. - In: Journal of Corporate Finance 30 (2015) C, pp. 132-149

The economic value of the Say-On-Pay (SOP) provision of the Dodd–Frank Act has been a subject of debate. Proponents of this provision suggest these votes benefit shareholders by increasing investor influence over managerial compensation. Opponents of the SOP provision believe compensation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011190847