We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite, but unbounded populations, where the set of possible projects for each jurisdiction/club is unrestricted in size. Under boundedness of per capita payoffs, which simply ensures that...

We study the research productivity of new graduates of top Ph.D. programs in economics. We find that class rank is as important as departmental rank in predicting future research productivity. For example the best graduate from UIUC or Toronto in a given year will have roughly the same number of...

We study the research productivity of new graduates of top Ph.D. programs in economics. We find that class rank is as important as departmental rank as predictors of future research productivity. For example the best graduate from UIUC or Toronto in a given year will have roughly the same number...

We consider a simple model in which agents are endowed with heterogeneous abilities and differing degrees of honesty. Agents choose either to become criminals or invest in education and become workers instead. The model is closed in that all criminal proceeds are stolen from agents working in...

We consider a general equilibrium economy with public goods and externalities. Following Boyd and Conley (1997), we treat externality markets directly instead of indirectly through Arrovian commodities. Because such direct externality markets are not subject to the nonconvexities that Starrett...

This letter calls attention a recent trend in economics publishing that seems to have slipped under the radar: large increases in submissions rates across a wide range of economics journals and steeply declining acceptance rates as a consequence. It is argued that this is bad for scholarly...

We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite but unbounded populations, where the set of possible projects for each jurisdiction/club is unrestricted in size. Under boundedness of per capita payoffs, which simply ensures that equal...

We consider a model of a local public goods economy with differentiated crowding that distinguishes between the tastes and crowding characteristics of agents. Crowding characteristics are those aspects of an agent that have a direct external effect on other members of the coalition to which he...

The 'crowding types' model of a local public goods economy makes a distinction between crowding effects and tastes of agents. Decentralization of the core is possible both with anonymous admission prices that depend only on publicly observable information and, when technology is linear, with...