We argue that one reason why emerging economies borrow short term is that it is cheaper than borrowing long term. This is especially the case during crises, as in these episodes the relative cost of long-term borrowing increases. We construct a unique database of sovereign bond prices, returns,...

We argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by international capital markets on long-term debt. First, we present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders. By issuing...

Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by international capital markets on long-term debt. They first present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk-sharing problem between the government...

We study the determinants of comparative advantage in polluting industries. We combine data on environmental policy at the country level with data on pollution intensity at the industry level to show that countries with laxer environmental regulation have a comparative advantage in polluting...

In 2007, countries in the euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and low spreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising their deficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and,...

Conventional wisdom views the problem of sovereign risk as one of insufficient penalties. Foreign creditors can only be repaid if the government enforces foreign debts. And this will only happen if foreign creditors can effectively use the threat of imposing penalties to the country. Guided by...

We argue that emerging economies borrow short term due to the high risk premium charged by bondholders on long-term debt. First, we present a model where the debt maturity structure is the outcome of a risk sharing problem between the government and bondholders. By issuing long-term debt, the...

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents, especially during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. This is because when...

This paper analyzes the joint behavior of international capital flows by foreign and domestic agents -- gross capital flows -- over the business cycle and during financial crises. The authors show that gross capital flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows....

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreign and domestic agents, dubbed gross capital flows, over the business cycle and during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. When foreigners...