This paper provides a quantitative analysis of power relations and strategic investment in the transport system for Russian gas. First, we analyse how the architecture of the transport system determines Russia's bargaining power vis-a-vis (potential) transit countries. By applying the Shapley...

The gas industry is perhaps Russia’s least reformed major sector. Prices are regulated, exports are monopolised and the domestic market is dominated by a state-controlled, vertically integrated monopolist, OAO Gazprom. Gazprom combines commercial and regulatory functions, and maintains tight...

We study the impact of the liberalization of EU natural gas markets on the balance of power between `local champions', customers, and outside producers. We distinguish between two steps of the reform: 1. opening access to transit pipes and 2. opening access to distribution systems, hence...

This paper illustrates a methodology for analyzing bargaining games on network markets, by means of numerical models that can be calibrated with real data. Economic incentives to join or to expand a network depend on how the network surplus is being distributed, which in turn depends on a...

This paper illustrates a methodology for analyzing bargaining games on network markets, by means of numerical models that can be calibrated with real data. Economic incentives to join or to expand a network depend on how the network surplus is being distributed, which in turn depends on a...