When providing public goods through voluntary contributions, a donor may introduce unilateral matching in order to reduce underprovision of the public good and thus inefficiency. By itself, however, matching benefits the donor but harms the recipient. We apply Cornes and Hartley’s aggregative...

Lindahl equilibria are often seen as an ideal outcome of cooperation in a public-goods economy. But it has also been observed that, if no transfer payments are possible, the Lindahl equilibrium may not be Pareto-superior to the Nash outcome of the voluntary-contribution game. We derive...

In a public good economy the distribution of initial income is an important determinant of how many individuals contribute to the public good in Cournot-Nash equilibrium. In this paper, first a simple formula is derived that provides a measure for the size of the set of income distributions...

In this paper, we explore the relationship between an equitable distribution of the cost shares in cooperative public good provision and the core property of Pareto-optimal allocations. Core allocations do not only fulfil an important stability condition but are also the only promising...

Handlungsempfehlungen (deutsch): Gegenseitigkeit und Vertrauen können in verschiedener Weise den Abschluss internationaler Klimaschutzvereinbarungen fördern: 1. Klimapolitische Instrumente sollten derart gestaltet werden, dass sie mit dem Prinzip der Gegenseitigkeit („Reziprozität“)...

In this paper, we analyse how the prospect of international negotiations over transboundary pollution shapes intra-country transfer schemes when the governments of the countries' polluting regions are in charge of environmental policy and negotiations. Federal governments can implement...

The failure of previous climate policy leads us back to the public good characteristic of climate protection. The first aim of this paper is to identify by a simple graphical representation of 2x2 games, the ranges of constellations between country-specific environmental benefits and abatement...