This paper develops an oligopoly model with firms that may potentially be state-owned or privately owned and solves it for different cases in which the number and ownership of those firms vary. The results are then compared in terms of total surplus and consumer surplus, and this comparison...

This paper develops an oligopoly model with firms that may potentially be state-owned or privately owned, and solves it for different cases in which the number and ownership of those firms vary. The results are then compared in terms of total surplus and consumer surplus, and this comparison...

This paper studies privatization policy in an international oligopoly. The argument that equal treatment of foreign investors will be detrimental to domestic welfare by shifting profits from domestic to foreign firms is shown to be less relevant in privatization auctions than in greenfield FDI...

We determine whether or not a local regional government should privatize its local public firm in a mixed duopoly when it faces the problem of unidirectional transboundary pollution. We consider two regions in an economy, one located upstream and the other, downstream. Where both the local...

Cost asymmetries between the public and the private firms create a rationale for privatising the public firms. We show that this argument is restrictive, since it does not allow for other ways of reducing production inefficiency, which creates the motivation for privatisation. If the profit...

We investigate a mixed oligopoly with misleading advertising competition. We find that, a welfare-maximizing public enterprise always engages in misleading advertising and that, an increase in the number of firms increases the profit and advertising level of each private firm.

We show under general demand and cost conditions that in a mixed duopoly with pollution the government will implement the socially optimal outputs and abatements by a tax-subsidy scheme and keeping the public firm fully public. The scheme requires taxing outputs and subsidizing abatements at...

We establish a model wherein a private firm competes with a partially privatized firm whose objective function is endogenously determined through bargaining between owners—the welfare-maximizing government and dividend-maximizing private shareholders. Many existing works on partial...

The literature on mixed oligopoly shows that when production costs are quadratic the public firm is privatized if the competition in the product market is high enough. Similarly, when the public firm is less efficient than private firms and the marginal costs of production are constant, the...