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By offering or choosing a contract the informed agent might reveal information to the principal which could be used for immediate renegotiation. This is discussed in an axiomatic approach. We show that if, given the revealed information, there exists a contract which is preferred by everyone,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504482
If bidders can acquire information during the auction the descending auction is no longer equivalent to a first-price-sealed-bid auction. Revenue equivalence does not hold. The incentive to acquire information can even be larger in a descending auction than in an ascending auction.
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We consider a regulator who does not know how many firms should be granted a license to enter a market as he has limited information on their setup costs. We propose two auction formats which implement the efficient market structure. In a "jumping English auction" the price for a license...
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We analyze the classic moral hazard problem with the additional assumption that agents are inequity averse. The presence of inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. When the concern for equity becomes more important, there is convergence towards linear sharing rules. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011093727
Due to the specifics of the product electricity and electricity markets, there are considerable doubts whether „energy-only-electricity-markets“ can guarantee a desired level of security of energy supply. If in peak load periods, the price inelastic demand exceeds the supply, there will be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010820118
Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing strategy. The credible announcement of thoroughly auditing...
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We consider the design of an optimal auction in which the seller can determine the allocation and the disclosure rule of the mechanism. Thus, in contrast to the standard analysis of a optimal auctions, the seller can explicitly design the disclosure of the information received by each bidder as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895662