We investigate a pervasive voluntary disclosure practice ? managers including balance sheets with quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with expectations, we find that managers voluntarily disclose balance sheets when current earnings are relatively less informative, or when future...

Prior research has focused on management's concern with current relative performance to explain income smoothing. Recent economic theory, however, argues that concern about job security creates an incentive for managers to also consider anticipated future relative performance. Our empirical...

Under the assumption that capital markets are imperfect due to transactions costs and investor-manager information asymmetries, internally generated funds should be less costly than funds raised by issuing shares (Myers and Majluf 1984). This suggests that the mix of firms' sources of...

We study whether bestowing CEO and chairman duties on one individual affects a board's decision to dismiss an ineffective CEO. The results show that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is significantly lower when the CEO and chairman responsibilities are vested in the same...

We study whether bestowing CEO and chairman duties on one individual affects a board's decision to dismiss an ineffective CEO. The results show that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is significantly lower when the CEO and chairman responsibilities are vested in the same...