We consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator - who can only become active with the consent of both parties - in the background of...

We study how social norms and individual rationality in the process of coalition formation sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term this phenomenon the `tragedy of the clubs'. We model...

In this paper, we examine the problems facing a policy maker who observes inconsistent choices made by agents who are boundedly rational. We contrast a model-less and a model-based approach to welfare economics. We make the case for the model-based approach and examine its advantages as well as...

This important book, written by some of the leading scholars in the field, provides a comprehensive overview of recent advances in coalition theory and presents both the latest theoretical developments and novel applications in the field of economics.

Classical deÖnitions of complementarity are based on cross price elasticities, and so they do not apply, for example, when goods are free. This context includes many relevant cases such as online newspapers and public attractions. We look for a complementarity notion that does not rely on price...

Classical definitions of complementarity are based on cross price elasticities, and so they do not apply, for example, when goods are free. This context includes many relevant cases such as online newspapers and public attractions. We look for a complementarity notion that does not rely on price...