We show that a perfect correlated equilibrium distribution of an N-person game, as defined by Dhillon and Mertens (1996) can be achieved using a finite number of copies of the strategy space as the message space. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

We discuss global climate mitigation that builds on existing unilateral measures to cut emissions. We document the extent of these measures and discuss the rationale arguing that such measures have the potential to generate positive spillover effects both within and across countries. We argue...

This article addresses the stability properties of a simple economy (characterized by a one-dimensional state variable) when the representative agent, confronted by trajectories that are divergent from the steady state, performs transformations in that variable in order to improve forecasts. We...

We define a solution concept, perfectly contracted equilibrium, for an intertempo- ral exchange economy where agents are simultaneously price takers in spot commodity markets while engaging in non-Walrasian contracting over future prices. In a setting with subjective uncertainty over future...

We characterize the class of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (or strategy-proof) random social choice functions in the standard multi-dimensional voting model where voter preferences over the various dimensions (or components) are lexicographically separable. We show that these social...

Bank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex-ante require costly crises to occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When...

A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We ask whether an arbitrary...

The paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property, is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function...