In a beauty contest framework, welfare can decrease with public information if the precision of private information is exogenous, whereas welfare necessarily increases with public information if the precision is endogenous with linear costs of information acquisition. The purpose of this paper...

We consider a competitive bank loan market model where the marginal costs of managing and monitoring loans are assumed to increase as borrowers' net worth decreases. We show that the responsiveness of equilibrium bank loan rates to changes in interbank money market rates become weaker as...

In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in...

In order to describe partial cooperation structures, this paper introduces complete coalition structures as sets of feasible coalitions. A complete coalition structure has a property that, for any coalition, if each pair of players in the coalition belongs to some feasible coalition contained in...

In a beauty contest framework, welfare can decrease with public information if the precision of private information is exogenous, whereas welfare necessarily increases with public information if the precision is endogenous with linear costs of information acquisition. The purpose of this paper...