We show the nuetrality of coalition formation in the sequential bargaining game a la Stahl-Binmore-Rubinstein with random proposers. To that end, we juxtapose an ex-ante coalition formation stage to their bargaining game. Based on the expected outcomes in the negotiation over how to split a...

This paper considers general bargaining outcomes under coalition structures formed by an external patent holder and firms in oligopoly markets. The main propositions are as follows. For each coalition structure, the kernel is a singleton; thus, the number of licensees that maximizes the patent...

We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (Soc Choice Welf 30(1):69–87, <CitationRef CitationID="CR15">2008</CitationRef>): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round [random role (RR) vs. fixed role...</citationref>

Examining two polar forms of restricted franchise contract, Nariu (2004) studied the pricing behavior of manufacturers and retailers and the market outcomes. This note provides a concise justification for his assumptions on contractual restraints. Introducing some fixed amount that a...