This Paper provides a game theoretic extension of Radner's (1993) model of hierarchical information aggregation. It studies the role of the hierarchy design for the speed and quality of a collective decision process. The hierarchy is described as a programmed network of agents. The programme...

A group of P identical managers has to make a choice between N alternatives. They benefit from reaching the decision quickly. In order to learn which is the best option, the alternatives have to be compared. A manager is able to identify the better one of two alternatives only with a certain...

Abstract We study a one-shot information aggregation problem in which agents have to provide effort in order to understand the information they are supposed to process. Agents have a common interest in reaching a good decision but suffer from an individual cost of providing effort. Showing that...

We present a model in which an agent takes actions to affect her reputation with two audiences with diverse preferences. This contrasts with standard reputation models that consider a homogeneous audience. A new aspect that arises is that different audiences may observe outcomes commonly or...