The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners’ dilemma backwards, from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion, and where discount rates appear as the...

We characterize the interplay between firms’ decision in terms of product differentiation and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between firms’ decision at the development stage and their intertemporal preferences.

The authors characterize the interplay between firms' decisions in terms of either horizontal or vertical product differentiation and their ensuing price behavior, be that collusive or not. They prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between firms' decisions at the development stage...

This paper tackles the issue of choosing roles in duopoly games. First, it is shown that the two necessary (and sufficient, if both satisfied) conditions for sequential play to emerge at equilibrium are that both leader and follower are at least weakly better off than under simultaneous play....