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When the number of players is small in a weighted majority voting game, it can occur that one of the players has no influence on the result of the vote, in spite of a strictly positive weight. Such a player is called a “dummy” player in game theory. The purpose of this paper is to...
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the apportionment of seats in intercommunal structures in the Val-d?Oise region. We compare the observed distribution of the seats to a theoretical one obtained with the Webster?s method (or Saint-Laguë?s method). This comparison is made using the most...
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The new lru law (loi relative aux libertés et responsabilités des universités) changed the structure of power within the French university system. Prior to this law, the President of a university was elected by the members of three governing bodies: i) the board of directors, ii) the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008632711
The aim of this article is to measure the power of the members of french universities boards of directors, power such as mentioned by the law relative to the liberties and the responsabilities of universities (in french, the ?LRU? law). We use tools from the cooperative game theory, and...
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In this paper we compare five well-known methods of apportionment, advanced respectively by Adams, Dean, Hill, Webster and Jefferson. The criterion used for this comparison is the minimization of the distance between a power vector and a population vector. Power is measured with the well-known...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010898175