The purpose of or paper is to study licensing policies for the owner of a product innovation in a spatial model. We compare patent holder’s profits when fees are used to extract licensees’ rents both in the cases of noncompetitive ( the licence includes en exclusive territory clause) and...

We analyze a multi-stage non-cooperative game involving an outside patent-holder, who seeks to licence a process innovation, and two price-setting firms located on a circumference. Three licensing policies are studied: the auction, the fixed fee and the per unit output royalty. The main finding...

This paper studies, in a spatial model. optimal licensing policies by first, comparing our results with the standard (non-spatial) licensing literature, and second, how results are affected if the patent holder can introduce a vertical restraint (exclusive territories). Contrary to standard...

This paper studies licensing policies for the owner of a new product and addresses their welfare impact in the assessment of market failures. We show that the best licensing policy for the patent holder is fixed fee licensing with an exclusive territory clause. Consumers are also better off with...