Earlier literature on tax competition and policy coordination typically assumes that the labor market is competitive; a description less suitable for Europe, where trade unions have had a strong position in the labor market for a long time. This paper concerns factor income taxation and public...

Earlier literature on tax competition and policy coordination typically assumes that the labor market is competitive; a description less suitable for Europe, where trade unions have had a strong position in the labor market for a long time. This paper concerns factor income taxation and public...

We analyze the welfare consequences of tax coordination agreements that cover taxes on mobile capital and on immobile labor. In doing so, we take into account two important institutional details. First, we incorporate decentralized wage bargaining, giving rise to involuntary unemployment....

To determine the welfare effects of tax coordination, it is often assumed that one tax is jointly increased and all other policy instruments are held constant. This paper, in contrast, analyzes partial coordination in the sense that each country can still adjust another tax, which is not subject...

Small monopoly trade unions decide upon the wage rate per hour and the hours of work subject to firm's demand for union members. Since the resulting Nash equilibrium is characterized by excess unemployment, we study the employment and welfare effects when trade unions try to coordinate their...