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This paper investigates face-to-face lying and beliefs associated with it. In experiments in Sweden and Japan, subjects answer questions about personal characteristics, play a face-to-face sender-receiver game and participate in an elicitation of lie-detection beliefs. The previous finding of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645161
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Antitrust authorities in many countries have been trying to establish appropriate competition policies based on economic analysis. Recently an anti-cartel policy called a "leniency program" has been introduced in many countries as an effective policy to dissolve cartels. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005493122
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the guilt aversion hypothesis by using a trust game with pre-play communication. For this purpose, we first develop a new version of guilt aversion called personal guilt aversion. It is shown that the new version is consistent with extant experimental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776760
As one of the best-known examples of the paradox of backward induction, centipede games have prompted a host of studies with various approaches and explanations (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; Fey et al., 1996; Nagel and Tang, 1998; Rapoport et al., 2003; Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2009). Focusing on initial plays...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048097
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In the theoretical assumption of informational cascades, private signals and predecessors' actions are equivalently informative before informational cascades, but are not once informational cascades have started. This experimental study tests this assumption by measuring the informativeness of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835983
We present the experimental results of cheap-talk games with private information. We systematically compare various equilibrium refinement theories and bounded rationality models such as level-k analysis in explaining our experimental data. As in the previous literature, we find that when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005066738
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We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms "truth bias" reported in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747352