We model academic competition as a game in which researchers ¯ght for priority. Researchers privately experience breakthroughs and decide how long to let their ideas mature before making them public, thereby establishing priority. In a two-researcher, symmetric environment, the resulting...

We consider a risk averse planner who has access to different energy sources to produce electricity; hydroelectricity is produced with a dam and thermal electricity is obtained from an unlimited supply at some exogenous cost. The dam is supplied with a random water ow. The presence of...

We study a preemption game in which two potential competitors come into play at some random secret times. The presence of a competitor is revealed to her opponent only when the former moves, which terminates the game. We show that all perfect Bayesian equilibria give rise to the same...

We model academic competition as a game in which researchers ¯ght for priority. Researchers privately experience breakthroughs and decide how long to let their ideas mature before making them public, thereby establishing priority. In a two-researcher, symmetric environment, the resulting...

A fixed budget must be allocated to a finite number of different projects with uncertain outputs. The expected marginal productivity of capital in a project first increases then decreases with the amount of capital invested. Such behavior is common when output is a probability (of escaping...

We consider a preemption game with two potential competitors who come into play at some random secret times. The presence of a competitor is revealed to a player only when the former moves, which terminates the game. We show that all perfect Bayesian equilibria give rise to the same distribution...