We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services. We assume that providers can increase demand by increasing quality but can also inflate activity through a manipulative effort (upcoding or DRG creep). We derive and compare the optimal price and...

Performance indicators are increasingly used to regulate quality in health care and other areas of the public sector. We develop a model of contracting between a purchaser (principal) and a provider (agent) under the following scenarios: a) higher ability increases quality directly and...

We model purchaser–provider contracts when providers can inflate reimbursable activity through manipulation. Providers are audited and fined upon detected fraud. We characterise the optimal price and audit policy both in the presence and absence of commitment to an audit intensity. Under...

We assess the impact of population structure on economic growth. Following recent research, we focus on the generational turnover as a key driver of consumption growth. We characterize the impact of the average birth and death rates on the generational turnover, depending on the age-profile of...

We consider an endogenous growth model with Blanchard-Yaari-type overlapping generations that is built around four sectors: final and intermediate goods production, an R&D sector and a health care sector. Health care serves to lower mortality and morbidity, the latter being related to...