In this paper, we look at the (Kajii and Ui) mixed equilibrium notion, which has been recognized by previous literature as a natural solution concept for incomplete information games in which players have multiple priors on the space of payoff relevant states. We investigate the problem of...

In this paper we consider a model of games of incomplete information under ambiguity in which players are endowed with variational preferences. We provide an existence result for the corresponding mixed equilibrium notion. Then we study the limit behavior of equilibria under perturbations on the...

Different solution concepts for strategic form games have been introduced in order to weaken the consistency assumption that players' beliefs - about their opponents strategic choices - are correct in equilibrium. The literature has shown that ambiguous beliefs are an appropriate device to deal...

In previous papers we studied a game model in which players' uncertainty is expressed entirely in the space of probabilities (lotteries) over consequences, it depends on the entire strategy profile chosen by the agents and it is described by the so called ambiguous beliefs correspondences. In...

The goal of this paper is to provide some new cooperative characterizations and optimality properties of competitive equilibria supported by non-linear prices. The general framework is that of economies whose commodity space is an ordered topological vector space which need not be a vector...

An exchange economy with asymmetrically  informed agents is considered with an exogenous rule that regulates  the information sharing among agents. For it, the notion of stable  sets à la Von Neumann and Morgenstern is analyzed. Two different  frameworks are taken into account as regards...

We extend Vind's classical theorem on the measure of blocking coalitions valid in finite dimensional atomless economies (see [29]), to include the possibility of infinitely many commodities as well as the presence of atoms. The commodity space is assumed to be an ordered Banach space which has...

In Hart and Kurz (1983), stability and formation of coalition structures has been investigated in a noncooperative framework in which the strategy of each player is the coalition he wishes to join. However, given a strategy profile, the coalition structure formed is not unequivocally determined....