In this article we distinguish between two types of single-firm conduct. The first, which we call "extraction," is conduct engaged in by the firm to capture surplus from what the firm has itself created independent of the conduct’s effect on rivals. The second, which we call “extension," is...

This paper presents empirical evidence on why firm become corporate criminals. We investigate the relationship between corporate ownership structure and the prior probability of observing corporate crime.

Despite enormous changes in factors affecting milk supply and demand, total fluid consumption has been essentially constant since 1944 in the U.S. (since 1961 in the E.U.) Classical economic analysis cannot explain persistently constant consumption in dramatically changing markets. However, this...

The intuition tat poorly performing corporations are more likely to engage in crime is found through-out the contemporary literature on the economics of corporate misconduct. Yet little evidence of such a relationship exists. This paper presents new evidence on the relationship between prior...

Cassady (1967) describes an auction in which the auctioneer “fishes” for an opening bid, calling out lower and lower amounts until an opening bid is eventually placed. Once a bid is placed, it is not uncommon for the bidding to escalate above the initial starting price. The current study...