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In this article, we generalize the position value, defined by Meessen (1988) for the class of deterministic communication situations, to the class of generalized probabilistic com- munication situations (G ́ Gomez et al. (2008)). We provide two characterizations of this new allocation rule....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011026229
We introduce a new allocation rule, called the sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest TU-games. We provide two axiomatic characterizations for this allocation rule. The first one uses the classical property of component efficiency plus an edge deletion property. The second...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011161038
We investigate assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees where the allocation rule is given by the permission value. We focus on efficient hierarchies,namely those, for which the payoff of the top agent is maximized. For additive games, such hierarchies are always cogent, namely, more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011112225
We survey axiomatic results concerning the Shapley value [Shapley, 1953]. This marginalist allocation rule results from an axiomatic study of the class of coalitional games. Several authors have enriched Shapley?s axiomatic study and have provided new characterizations of this allocation rule....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011187140
We consider the problem of sharing water from a river among the group of countries located along it. The benefit of each country depends on the amount of water it consumes. An allocation of the water is efficient when it maximizes the total benefits of the countries. The problem of finding a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856006
The river sharing problem deals with the fair distribution of welfare resulting from the optimal allocation of water among a set of riparian agents. Ambec and Sprumont [Sharing a river, J. Econ. Theor. 107, 453–462] address this problem by modeling it as a cooperative TU-game on the set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010682645
The goal of this article is to generalize the position value (Meessen, 1988) in order to take into account the negotiation powers of players on the allocation of the worth. These negotiation powers are formalized via a weight scheme similar to the one defined by Haeringer (2006). We define and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662569
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010157575
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009185936
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'European Journal of Operational Research', 2014, 238, 786-796.<P> Generalized characteristic functions extend characteristic functions of 'classical' TU-games by assigning a real number to every ordered coalition being a permutation of any...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257247