Several relaxations of Nash equilibrium are shown to exist in strategic games with discontinuous payoff functions. Those relaxations are used to extend and unify several recent results and link Reny's better-reply security condition [Reny, P.J. (1999). On the existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy...

In a recent but well known paper, Reny has proved the existence of Nash equilibria for compact and quasiconcave games, with possibly discontinuous payoff functions. In this paper, we prove that the quasiconcavity assumption in Reny's theorem can be weakened : we introduce a measure allowing to...

This paper proves the existence of a pseudo-equilibrium in a financial economy with incomplete markets in which the agents may have nonordered preferences. We will use a fixed-point-like theorem of Bich and Cornet that generalizes the results by Hirsch, Magill, Mas-Colell [18] and Husseini,...

In a recent but well known paper, Reny has proved the existence of Nash equilibria for compact and quasiconcave games, with possibly discontinuous payoff functions. In this paper, we prove that the quasiconcavity assumption in Reny's theorem can be weakened : we introduce a measure allowing to...

We provide a continuous representation of quasi-concave mappings by their upper level sets. A possible motivation is the extension to quasi-concave mappings of a result by Ulam and Hyers, which states that every approximately convex mapping can be approximated by a convex mapping.

This paper proves the existence of a pseudo-equilibrium in a financial economy with incomplete markets in which the agents may have nonordered preferences. We will use a fixed-point-like theorem of Bich and Cornet that generalizes the results by Hirsch, Magill, Mas-Colell [18] and Husseini,...

New relaxations of the Nash equilibrium concept are shown to exist in any strategic game with discontinuous payoff functions. The new concepts are used (1) to show the equivalence between Reny's better-reply security condition [28] and Simon-Zame's endogenous tie-breaking rule equilibrium...

Several relaxations of Nash equilibrium are shown to exist in strategic games with discontinuous payoff functions. Those relaxations are used to extend and unify several recent results and link Reny's better-reply security condition [Reny, P.J. (1999). On the existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy...

In this paper, we prove an existence theorem for approximated equilibria in a class of discontinuous economies. The existence result is a direct consequence of a discontinuous extension of Brouwer’s fixed point Theorem (1912), and is a refinement of several classical results in the standard...