Most of regulators in health care systems use pooling contracts such that payment do not depend on the level of severity. This policy is motivated by concerns about the moral hazard problem. In this paper, we show that it can be optimal when patient severity is private information because of the...

This article analyzes the properties of the so-called « T2A » DRG-based hospital payment policy implemented in France since 2004. The limits of this policy, whose aim is to induce productive efficiency, are studied in the first part. It is shown that serious drawbacks come from the lack of...

We analyze quality competition between hospitals under vertical health care services differentiation and price regulation. We show that a regulator can set a price to achieve the first-best level of quality for any market structure. However, under free entry, the number of entering hospitals at...

[eng] Awarding Contracts According to the Best Bids in Economic Terms by Florence Naegelen . This article examines problems arising from the criterion for determining the best bids in tenders where the quality of products can be observed. The optimum procedure is one where bidders can provide...

[fre] La réglementation hospitalière : tarification par pathologie ou achat de soins ? par Michel Mougeot, Florence Naegelen . De nombreux pays ont mis en place des mécanismes incitatifs pour maîtriser des dépenses de santé. La tarification par pathologie repose sur une logique de...