This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a family of so-called efficient maxmin solutions which can be seen as generalizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to nonconvex n-person bargaining problems. Moreover, it is shown that even though there are several efficient maxmin...

In the present paper we consider the allocation of costs in connection networks. Agents have connection demands in form of pairs of locations they want to have connected. Connections between locations are costly to build. The problem is to allocate costs of networks satisfying all connection...

In this paper we consider a family of cost allocation rules for which agents pay a share of their incremental cost as well as of any ‘debt’ from prior agents. This family encompasses the Bird rule and the free riding rule (where terminal agents pay everything) as the two extreme cases. By...

We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We characterize a family of allocation rules ranging from the so-called zero-transfer rule (which awards agents in the hierarchy their individually...

In the present paper a generalization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to nonconvex n-person bargaining problems is provided. The generalization is obtained by a slight weakening of the axioms used in Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) and Roth (1980).

This paper is concerned with the measurement of intertemporal performance for similar production activities. It abandons the Farrell tradition which relies on efficient production frontiers, instead it focuses on pure dominance relationships among observed activities. The sole assumption on the...

This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a family of so-called efficient maxmin solutions which can be seen as generalizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to nonconvex n-person bargaining problems. Moreover, it is shown that even though there are several efficient maxmin...