We analyze contracting between an innovator endowed with an idea and a project developer. The innovator has private information about the value of his idea, whereas the developer must exert some non-verifiable effort at the development stage. The developer may also threaten to leave the...

This article proposes a perspective on international climate agreements, based on mechanism design. We exhibit a trade-off between incentives and participation. We derive a general condition under which the first-best allocation can be implemented. We then discuss how this condition is affected...

This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement international environmental agreements in the multilateral externalities context of global warming. Asymmetric information and voluntary participation by sovereign and heterogenous countries are key...

This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement international environmental agreements in the multilateral externalities context of global warming. Asymmetric information and voluntary participation by sovereign and heterogeneous countries are key...

This paper discusses the feasibility and performances of simple mechanisms to implement international environmental agreements in the multilateral externalities context of global warming. Asymmetric information and voluntary participation by sovereign and heterogenous countries are key...

We analyze environmental agreements in contexts with asymmetric information, voluntary participation by sovereign countries and possibly limited enforcement. Taking a mechanism design perspective, we study how countries can agree on effort levels and compensations to take into account...