This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing gatekeeping general practitioners (GPs) to select their payment mechanism. We model GPs’ behavior under the most common payment schemes (capitation and fee for service) and when GPs can select one among them. Our analysis considers GP...

This paper analyzes the timing decisions of pharmaceutical firms to launch a new drug in countries involved in international reference pricing. We show three important features of launch timing when all countries reference the prices in all other countries and in all previous periods of time....

Some countries allow physicians to balance bill patients, that is, to bill a fee above the one that is negotiated with, and reimbursed by the health authorities. Balance billing is known for restricting access to physicians’ services while supplemental insurance against balance billing amounts...

This paper analyzes how drug approval procedures influence the incentives of pharmaceutical firms to launch new drugs in the presence of international reference pricing. First, we show that the set of countries in which a firm commercializes a new drug is larger when countries do not approve...

We develop a theoretical model to compare the two major foreign aid modalities: project aid and budget support. These two modalities have a different impact on the production of ‘developmental goods’. Firstly, conditionality can be associated with budget support, but only a subset of the...

This paper analyzes and compares the incentive properties of some common payment mechanisms for GPs, namely fee for service (FFS), capitation and fundholding. It focuses on gatekeeping GPs and it specifically recognizes GPs heterogeneity in both ability and altruism. It also allows inappropriate...

Several experiments show that feedback transmission mechanisms mitigate opportunistic behavior in social dilemmas. The source of this effect, especially in a repeated interaction, nonetheless remains obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for channels by which feedback may affect...

When the assignment of incentives is uncertain, we study how the regularity and frequency of rewards and risk attitudes influence participation and effort. We contrast three incentive schemes in a real-effort experiment in which individuals decide when to quit : a continuous incentive scheme and...

En période de crise économique, les besoins de l’Etat augmentent et l’assiette fiscale se réduit ; il est alors courant de voir resurgir dans le débat public la lutte contre les diverses formes de fraude qui reduisent les recettes publiques. Dans ce contexte, on oppose régulièrement...

Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentally the role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’s performance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher when individuals are...