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We analyze the role resale creates for zero-value bidders, called speculators, in standard auctions with symmetric independent private values buyers. English/second-price auctions always have equilibria with active resale markets and positive profits for a speculator. In first- price/Dutch...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561846
This paper contributes to the literature on second-price auctions with resale. We add speculators---bidders with value zero---to the standard symmetric independent private values environment. There always exists a continuum of inefficient equilibria that are profitable for a speculator. With no...
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We analyze first-price auctions with two asymmetric bidders, where the winner can offer the good for resale to the loser. One bidder has a private value for the good, the other bidder - the speculator - has zero value. We show that, independently of the resale market rules, the speculator's...
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This paper makes two contributions in the context of seller-buyer relationships with bilateral relationship-specific investment. Firstly, we demonstrate how ex-post negotiations via double auctions can be used to alleviate and often resolve the hold-up problem. Secondly, we show that ex-post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010538271
This paper makes two contributions in the context of seller-buyer relationships with bilateral relationship-speciï¬c investment. Firstly, we demonstrate how ex-post negotiations via double auctions can be used to alleviate and often resolve the hold-up problem. Secondly, we show that ex-post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010538284
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