We model the design of labor market institutions in an economy characterized by moral hazard and irreversible investment. In this setting, the environment setting affects the bargaining power of labor. At the optimum the allocation of bargaining power balances the aforementioned frictions. We...

We propose a transactions cost theory of total factor productivity (TFP). In a world with asymmetric information and transactions costs, productivity must be induced by incentive schemes. Labor contracts trade off marginal benefits and costs of effort. The latter include, in addition to the...

This note demonstrates that it is still possible to identify the economy's technology from national income accounting data when wages are set through a bargaining process rather than the usual competitive mechanism. Applying the method to US data, we obtain that the output elasticity with...

We introduce a new class of measures of scholarly influence, which we term step-based indices. This class includes the prominent h-index, the publication count, and the i10-index. We show that the class of step-based indices is characterized by three axioms, consistency with worse scientists,...