We construct a game theoretic model of an oligarchic economy that potentially could be targeted by smart international sanctions. Oligarchs in this economy provide support for their leader, a strong man and potentially an autocrat, in return for favors that results in having income higher than...

The paper constructs a general equilibrium model of North–South trade with nontraded goods, real exchange rate, and a continuum of components that North partly offshores to South. It is shown that a protectionary policy which restricts offshoring may have the unintended consequence of widening...

type="main" xml:id="ecpo12023-abs-0001" <p>In the context of a simple model of strategic offshoring, we investigate the reasons why firms may simultaneously source fragments domestically and internationally. We explore the impacts of offshoring on the production pattern of finished goods, tradable...</p>

type="main" xml:id="ecpo12047-abs-0001" <p>We construct a general equilibrium model of urban unemployment with a continuum of heterogeneous urban firms producing differentiated products in a monopolistic competitive market. We introduce a notion of pattern of technical progress among the...</p>

We show that wage behavior as well as the skilled-unskilled wage gap depend on elasticity of import demand. Although, our analysis is in the spirit of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, factor intensity plays no role in our results.

By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, the authors introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, they show that the partial compliance of the target country, along with mild sanctions, are not only an...

We construct a model whereby stock exchanges take a new role as an information intermediary, notably absent in their roles. We show that exchanges differentiate themselves at subgame perfect equilibrium and will not race to the top or the bottom.