There is a simple but overlooked way of capturing the wealth effect under CARA utility via making the absolute-risk aversion parameter wealth-dependent. We implement this approach in the asymmetric information setting of Verrecchia (1982), and compare it with the alternative approach of changing...

We develop and solve analytically a general equilibrium model where investors have heterogeneous wealth levels and exhibit uncertainty aversion. The model explains several salient patterns of household investments: (i) a sizeable fraction of households do not participate in the stock market,...

There is a simple method to account for the wealth effect of investment decisions that works under CARA utility via making the absolute risk aversion parameter wealth-dependent. Focusing on the setting of Verrecchia (1982), we compare our approach with that of Peress (2004) who instead changes...

In order to explain cross-country differences in the effects of capital market liberalization, this paper proposes a model of international asset markets in which investors in different countries each face constraints on portfolio choice. The model demonstrates that liberalization, i.e. the...

Models of frictionless markets in which investors hold heterogeneous beliefs are observationally equivalent to those in which investors have different degrees of ambiguity aversion in the sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989): the investors who are more optimistic about a certain asset will hold...

type="main" <title type="main">ABSTRACT</title> <p>This paper analyzes the dynamic portfolio choice implications of strategic interaction among money managers who compete for fund flows. We study such interaction between two risk-averse managers in continuous time, characterizing analytically their unique equilibrium...</p>

Absent much theory, empirical works often rely on the following informal reasoning when looking for evidence of a mutual fund tournament: If there is a tournament, interim winners have incentives to decrease their portfolio volatility as they attempt to protect their lead, while interim losers...

Money managers behave strategically when competing for fund flows within relatively small groups. We study strategic interaction between two risk-averse managers in continuous time, characterizing analytically their unique equilibrium dynamic investments. Driven by chasing and contrarian...

Absent much theory, empirical works often rely on the following informal reasoning when looking for evidence of a mutual fund tournament: If there is a tournament, interim winners have incentives to decrease their portfolio volatility as they attempt to protect their lead, while interim losers...

This paper investigates the competition among portfolio managers as they attempt to outperform each other. We provide a tractable dynamic continuous-time model of competition between two risk-averse managers concerned about relative performance. To capture the managers’ asset specialization,...