We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of departure functions. We use these characterizations to...

We consider discrete-time learning dynamics in finite strategic form games, and show that games that are close to a potential game inherit many of the dynamical properties of potential games. We first study the evolution of the sequence of pure strategy profiles under better/best response...

This paper argues that the extent of financial contagion exhibits a form of phase transition: as long as the magnitude of negative shocks affecting financial institutions are sufficiently small, a more densely connected financial network (corresponding to a more diversified pattern of interbank...

We provide a framework for studying the relationship between the financial network architecture and the likelihood of systemic failures due to contagion of counterparty risk. We show that financial contagion exhibits a form of phase transition as interbank connections increase: as long as the...

This chapter develops a unified framework for the study of how network interactions can function as a mechanism for propagation and amplification of microeconomic shocks. The framework nests various classes of games over networks, models of macroeconomic risk originating from microeconomic...