This paper proposes an extension of p-dominance called q-resistant equilibrium, which has the largest resistance to payoff-dependent mistakes. The selection could differ from the risk-dominant equilibrium, and a sufficient condition for a q-resistant equilibrium to follow risk-dominance is provided.

This paper applies quantal response equilibrium (QRE) models (McKelvey and Palfrey, Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995), 6-38) to a wide class of symmetric coordination games in which each player's best response is determined by an order statistic of all players' decisions, as in the classic...

This paper proposes a panel unit root test for micropanels with short time dimension (T) and large cross section (N). There are several distinctive features of this test. First, the test is based on a panel AR(1) model, which allows for cross-sectional dependency, which is introduced by the...