In this paper, we introduce the fairness approach to efficiency wages into a standard model of international fragmentation. This gives us a theoretical framework in which wage inequality and unemployment rates are co-determined and therefore the public concern can be addressed that international...

We analyze unionized firms' incentives to outsource intermediate goods production to foreign (low-cost) subcontractors. Such outsourcing leads to increased wages for the remaining in-house production. We find that stronger unions, which imply higher domestic wages, reduce incentives for...

In a two-country reciprocal dumping model, with one country unionised, we analyse how wage setting and firm location are influenced by trade liberalisation. We show that trade liberalisation can induce FDI, which is at odds with conventional theoretical wisdom and cannot happen in a...

In a two-country reciprocal-dumping model, with one country unionized, we analyse how wage setting and firm location are influenced by trade liberalization. We show that trade liberalization can induce a unionized firm to move all production abroad. This cannot prevail in a corresponding,...

We analyze unionized firms’ incentives to outsource intermediate goods production to foreign (low-cost) subcontractors. Such outsourcing leads to increased wages for the remaining in-house production. We find that stronger unions, which imply higher domestic wages, reduce incentives for...

We study ex post outsourcing of production in an imperfectly discriminating contest, interpreted here as a research tournament or a procurement contest for being awarded some production contract. We find that the possibility of outsourcing increases competition between the contestants, leading...

In this paper, we study the effects of introducing endogenous costs in a Tullock model of rent-seeking. We show that unions can be efficiency improving, and that the firms' levels of effort depend more critically upon the number of firms participating in the contest when unions are present. We...

We find that trade unions have a rational incentive to oppose the adoption of labour-saving technology when labour demand is inelastic and unions care much for employment relative to wages. Trade liberalization typically increases trade union technology opposition. These conclusions are reached...