Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs an income tax schedule for redistributive purposes and provides a public good optimally. There are two types of individuals, distinguished by...

The impacts of changing the number of individuals of a particular skill level on the solutions to two versions of the finite population optimal nonlinear income tax problem are investigated. In one version, preferences are quasilinear in leisure. For this version, it is shown that it is possible...

Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs a redistributive income tax schedule and provides a public input into a nonlinear production process. These assumptions imply that wage rates are...

Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs an income tax schedule for redistributive purposes and provides a public good optimally. There are two types of individuals, distinguished by...

Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings is considered in a two-period model with two individuals who have additively separable preferences and who only differ in their skill levels. When the government can commit to its second period policy, taxes on savings do not form part of the...

The impact of changing an individual's skill level on the solution to a finite population version of the Mirrlees optimal nonlinear income tax problem with quasilinear-in-leisure preferences is investigated. It is shown that it is possible to sign the directions of change in everyone's optimal...