We present an economic model of fixing or patching a software problem after the product has been released in the market. Specifically, we model a software firm’s trade-off in releasing a buggy product early and investments in fixing it later. We first show that patching investments and time to...

We empirically estimate the effect of competition on vendor patching of software defects by exploiting variation in number of vendors that share a common flaw or common vulnerabilities. We distinguish between two effects: the direct competition effect when vendors in the same market share a...

We present a model of fixing or patching a software problem after the product has been released in the market. Specifically, we model a software firm's trade-off in releasing a buggy product early and investments in fixing it later. Just as the marginal cost of producing software can be...

Software vulnerabilities represent a serious threat to cybersecurity, most cyberattacks exploit known vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, there is no agreed-upon policy for their disclosure. Disclosure policy (which sets a protected period given to a vendor to release the patch for the...

Interviews with low-level drug dealers in New York City reveal that the monetary costs of distributing drugs are modest. Hence, the proportion of sales revenue retained by these sellers is a meaningful indicator of their earnings. There are four distinct types of sellers, with systematic...

Spreadsheets are commonly used and commonly flawed, but it is not clear how often spreadsheet errors lead to bad decisions. We interviewed 45 executives and senior managers / analysts in the private, public, and non-profit sectors about their experiences with spreadsheet quality control and with...

Background: There is ongoing interest in assessing the effectiveness of various drug control strategies, including policy intended to reduce initiation and prevalence. Compartmental models of trajectories of drug use have been developed that demonstrate that drug “systems” display...

This paper presents a dynamic game model of international terrorism. The time horizon is finite, about the size of one presidency, or infinite. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of incentive Stackelberg strategies for both decision-makers of the game (“The West” and “International...