We introduce a flexible framework by modeling the information firms possess about consumers' locations (preferences) on the Salop circle as a partition. Higher information quality is translated into a partition refinement. In the limit, we obtain the perfect price discrimination paradigm. We...

We propose a new location model where consumers are allowed to make multiple purchases (i.e., one unit from each firm). This model may fit many markets (e.g., newspapers, credit cards) better than existing models. A common feature of these markets is that some consumers are loyal to one brand,...

We employ the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972) to study the endogenous matching patterns in a market that consists of heterogenous principals and agents. We show that, in general, the equilibrium matching is non-assortative. We then characterize the equilibrium relationship between...

The number of patent applications and "bad" patents issued has been rising rapidly in recent years. Based on this trend, we study the overload problem within the Patent Office and its consequences on the firms' R&D incentives. We assume that the examination process of patent applications is...

Empirical studies have found that high litigation costs often discourage small firms from investing in R&D, as they fear their patent will be infringed and they will not be able to afford litigation. As a solution, firms have been encouraged to purchase insurance policies which, by covering...

We examine the profitability and the welfare implications of pricediscrimination in two-sided markets. Platforms have information aboutthe preferences of the agents that allows them to price discriminatewithin each group. The conventional wisdom from one-sided horizontallydifferentiated markets...