We examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed quot;watchdogquot; agents can implement...

We examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed quot;watchdogsquot; can implement...

We provide experimental evidence that non-binding pre-play communication between bidders in auctions of shares facilitates the adoption of equilibrium strategies: collusive strategies in uniform-price auctions, and the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in discriminatory auctions. When...

We provide experimental evidence that non-binding pre-play communication between bidders in auctions of shares facilitates the adoption of equilibrium strategies: collusive strategies in uniform-price auctions, and the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies in discriminatory auctions. When...

This paper models an economy in which managers, whose efforts affect firm performance, are able to make quot;insidequot; trades on claims whose value is also dependent on firm performance. Managers are able to trade only on quot;good news,quot; that is, on returns above market expectations....

In this paper we show, in an incomplete contracts framework which combines asymmetric information and moral hazard, that by permitting insiders to trade on personal account the equilibrium level of output can be increased and shareholder welfare can be improved. This result follows for two...

We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards and outsider-controlled boards. We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than...

Short-term financial claims held by uninformed outside investors impose a tax on insider opportunism by diluting the ownership stake of opportunistic owner-managers. By thus limiting managerial opportunism, short-term financing increases firm value and social welfare. When given a choice,...

This paper compares the predictions of finite-shareholder models of conditional and unconditional takeover offers with the outcomes of laboratory experiments. In addition to differentiating between types of offers, the experimental designs span small and large firms as well as different levels...

The relationship between asset demand and information quality in rational expectations economies is analyzed. First we derive a number of new summary descriptive statistics that measure four basic characteristics of investment style: asset selection, market timing, aggressiveness, and...