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In this paper, we compare five well-known methods of apportionment, the ones by Adams, Dean, Hill, Webster and Jefferson. The criteria used for this comparison is the minimization of a distance between a power vector and a population vector. The power is measured with the well-known Banzhaf...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009193291
The purpose of this paper is to present a structural specification of the Shapley- Shubik and Banzhaf power indices in a weighted voting rule. We compare them in term of the cardinality of the sets of power vectors (PV). This is done in different situations where the quota or the number of seats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009193292
This paper deals with real estate portfolio optimization when investors are risk averse. In this framework, we determine several types of optimal times to sell a diversified real estate and analyze their properties. The optimization problem corresponds to the maximization of a concave utility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009193290
In this paper we compare five well-known methods of apportionment, advanced respectively by Adams, Dean, Hill, Webster and Jefferson. The criterion used for this comparison is the minimization of the distance between a power vector and a population vector. Power is measured with the well-known...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010898175
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009808563
This paper analyzes a sequential voting mechanism that eliminates at each round one candidate, until only one of them is left (the winner). The candidates are the voters and they only differ across their skill level. The payoff allocated to the winner depends on the sequence of elimination of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010789968
A well-known result in Social Choice theory is the following: every scoring rule (positional rules) violates Condorcet consistency. A rule is Condorcet consistent when it selects the alternative that is preferred to every other alternative by a majority of individuals. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010575734
According to a given quota q, a candidate a is beaten by another candidate b if at least a proportion of q individuals prefer b to a. The q-Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the probability that the rule selects a q-Condorcet winner (q-CW), that is any candidate who is never beaten under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010672393
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005355874
Using data from financial reorganization plans filed by insolvent Canadian firms, we estimate the discount rate implicit in theunsecured creditors' reorganization decision. Using (HARA) utility functions, we find the implicit monthly discount rate of creditors to be 4.9%, which corresponds to an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552082