An economy with ex ante markets for future delivery contingent on ex post spot market prices is considered. Since spot prices are publicly observed ex post, this framework bypasses the enforcement problems that may arise as a result of differential information about states of nature....

We study a 3-region version of the Footloose Entrepreneur model by Forslid and Ottaviano (J Econ Geogr, 2003). We focus on the analysis of stability of three types of long-run equilibria: agglomeration, dispersion and partial dispersion. We find that the 3-region model exhibits more tendency for...

We consider a set K of differentiated commodities. A preference relation on the set of consumption plans is strictly monotonic whenever to consume more of at least one commodity is more preferred. It is an easy task to find examples of strictly monotonic preference relations when K is finite or...

We develop a model of general equilibrium with trade ex ante in a context of private and incomplete state verification. Instead of choosing bundles, agents choose lists of bundles out of which the market then selects one bundle for delivery. With agents having subjective expectations about the...

This paper provides a new characterization of competitive equilibrium allocations based on the veto mechanism. The main theorem shows that, in pure exchange economies with a continuum of non-atomic agents, the competitive equilibria can be characterized by strengthening the veto power of the...

We associate to any pure exchange economy a game with only two players, regardless of the number of consumers. In this two-player game, each player represents a different role of the society, formed by all the individuals in the economy. Player 1 selects feasible allocations trying to make...