In this paper, I modify Varian's [Varian, H.R. (1980). A model of sales, American Economic Review, 70(4), 651-659] model of sales to allow for heterogeneity in consumer preferences. I show that in mixed strategy equilibria each firm charges a finite number of prices. Using this characterization,...

In this paper, I modify Varian's (1980) model of sales to allow for heterogeneity in consumer preferences. I show that in mixed strategy equilibria each firm charges a finite number of prices. Using this characterization, I examine the e¤ect of consumer heterogeneity on firms' optimal pricing...

Since the inception of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program in 1975, cities and large urban counties have been entitled to funding based on a formula designed to approximate community need. As with any such federally funded and locally administered program, there is a tension...

How should price promotion strategies be modified in an emerging market (e.g., India, China) compared to those employed in developed markets (e.g., USA, Canada)? Specifically, how should the presence of middle-class consumers with limited ability to pay, prevalent in an emerging market,...

In this paper, I investigate the outcome of a price competition between two firms, each producing two complementary products. Specifically, I study each firm's decision to coordinate price promotions of its products. Consumers are divided into loyals, who purchase both products from their...

When nonprofit organizations in the U.S. engage in activities that are "substantially related" to their legal mission they pay no profits taxation, but profit from "unrelated business" (UB) activities is taxed. Since UB activity has no apparent justification other than to generate revenue, we...

This paper revisits the theory of oligopoly pricing and shows that for a large class of demand and cost functions, a mixed strategy equilibrium necessarily implies that each firm's equilibrium strategy is a discrete distribution over a finite number of prices.

In this note I investigate the outcome of a static price competition between a strong firm (a firm with an established loyal consumer base) and a weak firm (a firm without loyal consumers). The consumers are divided into the strong firm's loyal segment and the switching segment, members of which...

Our model illustrates how political institutions trade off between the competing goals of representation and governance, where governance is the responsiveness of an institution to a single pivotal voter. We use exogenous variation from the 30-year history of the federal Community Development...