Both formal (legal) and informal (culture, language, religion) institutions determine the intensity of cross-border joint ventures between one US and one foreign partner. Using a sample of cross-border joint ventures from 105 countries, we investigate the impact of country legal, cultural and...

Non-U.S. firms can converge toward U.S. capital market and legal regulations by cross-listing in the U.S. or by being acquired by a U.S. bidder. We show companies that are smaller, have lower growth opportunities, are capital intensive, and benefit from bonding through compliance with U.S....

Non-U.S. firms have two options to converge toward U.S. capital market and legal regulations - to cross-list in the U.S. or to agree to be acquired by a U.S. bidder. We show that companies that have lower growth opportunities, are more capital intensive, and seek bonding benefits through...

We hypothesize that macro-level liquidity affects the choice between tender-mergers and mergers. We employ a novel methodology to test this relationship. This method finds structural breaks in the number of tender-mergers relative to mergers and finds that the structural breaks coincide...

Using a sample of foreign firms listed in U.S. and delisting shares over the period 2000 and 2010, this paper studies the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the cross-delisting behavior of foreign firms based on the firm characteristics, legal tradition, overall culture and degree of...

Using a sample of newly initiated American Depository Receipt (ADR) programs over the period 2000 and 2004, this paper examines the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the cross-listing decision and the value consequences of cross-listing by foreign firms. We find that the passage of SOX did...

Legal rights of investors are recognized as an essential component of corporate governance. We assess the efficacy of these rights by examining board changes surrounding the filings of shareholder derivative lawsuits. We find that the incidence of derivative lawsuits is higher for firms with a...

An existing finance theory predicts that managers of takeover targets will increase leverage to enhance managerial control which can, in turn, allow target managers to thwart a takeover attempt altogether. We find that targets significantly increase leverage, not only by issuing more debt, but...