We develop a modification of the connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that takes into account negative externalities arising from the connectivity of direct and indirect neighbors, thus combining aspects of the connections model and the co-author model. We consider a general...

We develop a modification of the connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that takes into account negative externalities arising from the connectivity of direct and indirect neighbors, thus combining aspects of the connections model and the co-author model. We consider a general...

We develop a modification of the connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that takes into account negative externalities arising from the connectivity of direct and indirect neighbors, thus combining aspects of the connections model and the co-author model. We consider a general...

We develop a modification of the connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that takes into account negative externalities arising from the connectivity of direct and indirect neighbors, thus combining aspects of the connections model and the co-author model. We consider a general...

We consider a model of influence with a set of non-strategic agents and two strategic agents. The non-strategic agents have initial opinions and are linked through a simply connected network. They update their opinions as in the DeGroot model. The two strategic agents have fixed opinions, 1 and...

This paper presents a model of influence where agents' beliefs are based on an objective reality, such as the properties of an environment. The perception of the objective reality is not direct: all agents know is that the more correct a belief, the more successful the actions that are deduced...

This paper presents a model of influence where agents' beliefs are based on an objective reality, such as the properties of an environment. The perception of the objective reality is not direct: all agents know is that the more correct a belief, the more successful the actions that are deduced...

We consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of discount rates varying in time. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, we consider a model in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of...

We investigate a wage bargaining between the union and the firm where the parties' preferences are expressed by varying discount rates and the threat of the union is to be on go-slow instead of striking. First, we describe the attitude of the union as hostile or altruuistic where a hostile union...

A well-known model in sociology and marketing is that of opinion leadership. Opinion leaders are actors who are able to affect the behavior of their followers. Hence, opinion leaders have some power over their followers, and they can exercise this power by influencing their followers choice of...